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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates scalar implicatures and downward entailment in child 
English. In previous experimental work we have shown that adults ' computation 
of scalar implicatures is sensitive to entailment relations. For instance, when the 
disjunction operator or occurs in positive contexts, an implicature of exclusivity 
arises. By contrast when the disjunction operator occurs within the scope of a 
downward entailing linguistic expression, no implicature of exclusivity is 
computed. Investigations on children's  computation of scalar implicatures in the 
same contexts have led to a slightly different picture. In particular it has proven 
difficult to demonstrate that children compute scalar implicatures (in non­
downward entailing contexts) using the Truth Value Judgment task, a technique 
that has been used successfully in showing children's  sensitivity to other semantic 
phenomena. Adopting a different experimental technique called the Felicity 
Judgment task, however, we demonstrated children's  knowledge of the 
prerequisites to the computation of scalar implicatures (Chierchia, Crain, Guasti, 
Gualmini and Meroni, 2001 ). 
The present study extends this research by investigating children' s  
preferences for interpreting sentences containing the scalar terms or  and and in a 
downward entailing context. We present the results of an experiment using the 
Felicity Judgment task. The study draws upon the observation that scalar 
implicatures are sensitive to entailment relations, which are reversed in downward 
entailing contexts In section 2 we illustrate the phenomenon under investigation, 
and we describe the Semantic Core model, a recent account of such phenomenon 
(see Chierchia, 2001 ). Section 3 reviews previous research on children' s  
knowledge of  scalar implicatures motivated by the Semantic Core model and 
presents the findings of a new experiment. Section 4 presents a discussion of the 
experimental findings and section 5 provides the conclusions. 
2. Scalar Implicatures and Downward Entailment 
The standard neo-Gricean view of scalar implicatures maintains that the 
interpretation of logical words results from an interaction between semantic and 
pragmatic principles (see e.g., Grice, 1 975; Hom, 1 972, 1 989; Levinson, 1 983).  
On this view, principles of semantics account for the basic interpretation of 
logical words, but pragmatic principles also influence the interpretation of logical 
words in ordinary conversational contexts. To illustrate the interaction between 
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semantic and pragmatic principles, consider the interpretation of the disjunction 
operator or. The interpretation of disjunction that is licensed by semantic 
principles can be described as inclusive-or. However, or is often understood 
exclusively. Consider, for example, the following sentence: 
( 1 )  John learned English or German. 
Typically the utterance in ( 1 )  carries with it a scalar implicature. More precisely, 
upon hearing ( 1 )  one infers that John learned either English or German, but not 
both languages. Intuitively, the implicature of exclusivity arises because, if the 
speaker meant to say that John learned both English and German, a more effective 
means of expression would be (2). 
(2) John learned English and German. 
According to the Principle of Cooperation, the speaker is expected to convey the 
intended message as accurately as possible. Since the speaker did not use (2), the 
utterance in (3) is interpreted as : 
(3) John learned English or German, but not both. 
This is how the exclusive interpretation of or comes about, according to the neo­
Gricean view. 
Scalar implicatures (SIs) place statements against the background of a set 
of relevant alternatives that differ in the 'quantity' of information that they 
convey. As discussed extensively by Hom ( 1 972), one can view logical words 
like or and and as constituting a scale. In particular, the set of circumstances that 
verify a (positive) statement like A and B is a subset of the circumstances that 
verify A or B, so the logical words contained in these statements can be ordered 
through the subset/superset relationship: and c or. The same reasoning can be 
extended to all scalar items, such as quantifiers (every c most c many c some) 
and numerals ( . . .  two c three c .. ). Within this framework, the process through 
which implicatures are computed can be characterized as follows. 
(4) Suppose a and f3 are part of a scale such that a c p. Then if the speaker 
utters 8(13) (i.e. ,  the logically weaker scalar term), such a statement is 
interpreted as 8(13) and not 8(a).  
In a way, the computation of SIs resembles the interpretation of sentences with a 
focus operator. In both cases the interpretation of a sentence 8 requires the 
comparison of 8 against a set of alternative propositions, ALT, which have been 
introduced in the conversational background (e.g. , Rooth, 1 992; Krifka, 1 995). 
The choice of a sentence 8 from ALT implicates the negation of all stronger 
propositions in ALT. 
It is pertinent to observe that the process outlined above leads to a more 
informative interpretation than the basic interpretation of the speaker's utterance. I 
AT THE SEMANTICS/PRAGMATICS INTERFACE IN CHILD LANGUAGE 
This can be seen if we compare the circumstances which verify the basic 
interpretation of ( 1 )  and those which verify its derived interpretation (Le., (3» . On 
its basic interpretation, ( 1 )  is true in all the situations in (5). 
(5) situationl=John learned English 
situation2=John learned German 
situation3=John learned English and John learned German 
Once the implicature is added (with or construed exclusively), the statement in ( 1 )  
i s  true in only two of  these sets of  circumstances, namely situationl and situation2. 
In short, the exclusive-or interpretation rules out one set of circumstances that is 
allowed by inclusive-or and, thus, yields a more informative interpretation. 
According to the view just sketched, one first computes the 
(compositional) meaning of a sentence. Then, the semantic interpretation is 
processed by the pragmatic component of the language apparatus (where Gricean 
maxims are located) and as a result, implicatures are factored in. This modular 
view of the semantics-pragmatics interface suggests that implicatures are added at 
the level of root-sentences, Le. after the grammar has completed its job. As 
illustrated in (4), it is in uttering a certain sentence that one compares it with its 
scalar alternatives. This has as a consequence that one should not find embedded 
implicatures, because implicatures come about by negating alternatives to whole 
utterances (as in (3» . 
This view of scalar implicatures has recently been challenged by Chierchia 
(2001) .  One of the arguments Chierchia uses is the following. Consider a complex 
sentence such as : 
(6) Mary is working at her paper or seeing some students. 
Let us focus on the embedded implicature, Le. the one associated with some. With 
respect to that, the natural implication of the sentence is that Mary is working at 
her paper or seeing some (though not all) students. However, if implicatures only 
come about at the root level, this is not what one would expect. One would expect 
to negate some kind of alternative to sentence (6) as a whole. But this would yield 
the wrong results. To derive the negated alternative for some where it intuitively 
arises (namely within the second disjunct), the implicature has to be computed at 
the level of the embedded clause. 
Based on considerations of this sort, Chierchia proposes that implicatures 
are computed recursively, through a simple modification of the standard recursive 
procedure. The basic idea is the following. The syntactic tree is processed bottom 
up. Whenever we find an implicature trigger, the corresponding implicature is 
added at the first available site (say, at the first node of type t containing the 
trigger) . For instance, in processing (6), the implicature associated with some is 
added at the level of the second disjunct, while the implicature associated with or 
is introduced at the root level. 
Now, if implicatures are (or can be) introduced at any embedded level of 
embedding, the question arises as to whether they are always preserved under 
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embedding. This is clearly not so. Developing an observation due to Hom (1 989), 
Chierchia observes that there are embedded contexts from which the (ordinary) 
scalar implicatures are systematically cancelled. For example, in all of the 
following contexts, the disjunction operator receives an inclusive-or 
interpretation. 
(7) a. John did not learn French or Italian. 
b. Did John learn French or Italian? 
c. I doubt John learned French or Italian. 
d. If John learned French or Italian, he could apply for this job. 
e. John learned English before French or Italian. 
Interestingly, the same linguistic environments in (7) share another property: they 
license negative polarity items, like the word any in English: 
(8) a. John did not learn any Romance language. 
b. Did John learn any Romance language? 
c. I doubt John learned any Romance language. 
d. If John learned any Romance language, he could apply for this job. 
e. John learned English before any Romance language. 
On the basis of the examples in (7) and (8), Chierchia (2001 )  and Chierchia et al . 
(200 1 )  advanced the following generalization. 
(9) (Ordinary) scalar implicatures are absent from linguistic environments that 
license any. 
Supposing that any (as well as other negative polarity items) is licensed in 
downward entailing linguistic contexts (see Ladusaw, 1 979), the generalization in 
(9) becomes: 
( 1 0) (Ordinary) scalar implicatures are absent from downward entailing 
linguistic environments. 
What is interesting about the generalization in ( 1 0) is that a 
morpho syntactic phenomenon (the distribution of any) and a pragmatic 
phenomenon (the computation of scalar implicatures) are sensitive to the very 
same environments. The generalization in ( 1 0) casts doubt on the neo-Gricean 
account that places the phenomena of negative polarity licensing and the 
computation of scalar implicatures in separate modules of the language apparatus. 
Clearly, the same (semantic) principles govern both phenomena. 
Chierchia' s Semantic Core model proposes an account that unifies the 
phenomena. We will not be able to fully review the model within the limits of the 
present work. In so far as implicatures are concerned, however, the basic idea is 
the following. SI computation is subject to one general condition, which 
Chierchia (200 1 )  calls the Strength Condition. According to this condition, the 
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computation of scalar implicatures cannot lead to a weaker statement than the 
corresponding sentence without the implicature. Thus, at any point in the 
recursive procedure, if adding an implicature leads to a weaker statement than its 
plain counterpart, the implicature is cancelled. Consider for example ( 1 ), repeated 
here as ( 1 1 ) .  
( 1 1 ) John learned English or German. 
Upon encountering ( 1 1 ), the hearer factors in the implicature, constructing the 
'derived' interpretation which can be paraphrased as in ( 12) .  
( 1 2) John learned English or German and it is not the case that John learned 
English and German. 
Suppose that sentence ( 1 1 )  is embedded under believe. Since the result is stronger 
than its plain counterpart, the implicature is kept and the corresponding sentence 
is interpreted along the following lines : 
( 1 3) I believe that John learned English or German (but not both). 
Suppose, however, that the same sentence is embedded under doubt. In such a 
case, adding the implicature results in a weaker statement than its plain 
counterpart. Hence the implicature is removed, and the resulting sentence will be 
interpreted as follows. 
( 14) I doubt that John learned English or French (bat flot both). 
So far so good. Implicatures are construed locally as the value of a clause 
is computed bottom up. And as soon as a downward entailing (DE) functor comes 
into the picture, the Strength Condition forces us to remove any implicature that 
has been added thus far. But this is not all .  The interaction of negation (or a DE 
functor) with an embedded scalar term can also give rise to novel implicatures. To 
illustrate, consider the following sentence: 
( 1 5) Many papers were read by students. 
In isolation, this sentence will trigger the implicature that not all the relevant 
papers were read. If embedded under believe, the implicature will be kept. If the 
clause is embedded under doubt, the implicature will be removed: 
( 1 6) I doubt that many papers were read by students. 
This shows that sentence ( 16) induces a novel implicature, which can be 
paraphrased as follows: 
( 1 7) I believe that some papers were read by students. 
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This implicature arises because the alternatives relevant to the interpretation of 
( 1 6) are: 
( 1 8) I doubt that some papers were read. 
I doubt that many papers were read. 
I doubt that every paper was read. 
Since doubt reverses the strength of the items to which it applies, the strongest 
alternative to ( 1 8) is I doubt that some papers were read. Consequently, this is 
what gets negated, and gives rise to the implicature in ( 1 7) .  So, DE functors not 
only remove implicatures that were previously added in, they also recalibrate the 
scales, leading to novel implicatures. Following Chierchia, let us use the term 
direct implicature to refer to the implicatures that are added in at scope sites 
immediately containing the trigger. Direct implicatures are to be contrasted with 
indirect implicatures. These are implicatures that arise in applying a DE functor 
to an argument containing a scalar term. As we will see below, this distinction 
(motivated on both descriptive and theoretical grounds) has interesting 
psycho linguistic consequences. 
It is time to take stock. In developing the Semantic Core model, Chierchia 
(2001 )  proposes an explicit algorithm for calculating implicatures recursively and 
compositionally. Implicatures are no longer thought of as being added in at the 
level of root sentences. Rather, it is as if each phrase (as opposed to root 
sentences) is shipped off to the pragmatic component. The Semantic Core model 
avoids certain difficulties (such as dealing with implicatures embedded under 
disjunction), and it paves the way for a (new) account of the generalization in 
( 1 0) :  both SI calculation and any licensing are driven by the need to optimize 
informational strength. With this characterization of adult languages in mind, let 
us consider whether the same generalization also holds for child language. 
3. Scalar Implicatures and Downward Entailment in Child Language 
The previous section showed that the interpretation of the negative polarity item 
any and the computation of scalar implicatures are governed by the same 
recursive semantic principles (see Chierchia, 2001 ). In a series of experiments 
motivated by the Semantic Core model, Chierchia et al . (2001 )  investigated the 
computation of scalar implicatures in children and adults. 
The linguistic contexts investigated by Chierchia et al .  (2001 )  are the 
restrictor and the nuclear scope of the universal quantifier every. As shown by 
( 1 9a), the restrictor of the universal quantifier every is downward entailing and, 
therefore, licenses the negative polarity item any. By contrast, the nuclear scope 
of the universal quantifier every is not downward entailing, as attested by the 
ungrammaticality of ( 1 9b). 
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( 19) a. Every student who learned any Romance language is welcome. 
b. *Every student learned any Romance language. 
As we saw in section 2, the Semantic Core model explains why scalar 
implicatures are cancelled in downward entailing (DE) environments, as the 
computation of scalar implicatures would lead to less informative statements in 
these environments. Accordingly, the Semantic Core model predicts that the 
implicature of exclusivity for disjunction will arise in sentences like (20b), but not 
in sentences like (20a).  
(20) a. Every student who learned English or German is welcome. 
b. Every student learned English or German. 
Adult intuitions about the sentences in (20) conform to the predictions of the 
model. First, in (20a), adult speakers concede that if every student learned English 
and German, they would be welcome. Second, adult speakers of English judge 
(20b) to be infelicitous as a description of a context in which every student 
learned English and German. To see if children's  interpretation of sentences like 
(20) also conforms to the predictions of the Semantic Core model, Chierchia et al. 
(200 1 )  conducted two experiments using the Truth Value Judgment task. 
The Truth Value Judgment is an experimental technique that allows 
researchers to investigate whether a specific interpretation of a target sentence is 
licensed by children' s  grammars (Crain and McKee, 1 985 ;  Crain and Thornton, 
1 998). The task requires two experimenters. One acts out short stories in front of 
the child, using props and toys. The second experimenter manipulates a puppet 
who watches the stories alongside the child. Each story constitutes the context 
against which a target sentence is evaluated. The acceptance of the target sentence 
is interpreted as indicating that the child's  grammar licenses at least one 
interpretation that makes the sentence true in that context. By contrast, the 
consistent rejection of the target sentence is interpreted as evidence that child's  
grammar does not license any interpretation of the sentence that makes it true in 
the context under investigation.2 
3 . 1 .  Experiment I: The disjunction or in the first argument of every 
The first experiment in the Chierchia et al . study tested children' s  acceptance of 
the inclusive-or reading of disjunction in the restrictor of the universal quantifier 
every. On a typical trial, children were told a story about Snow White and four 
dwarves. Snow White promised a jewel to any dwarf that ate healthy food. Three 
of the dwarves wanted a jewel, so they chose fruit. In particular each of these 
dwarves chose both a banana and a strawberry, and then received a jewel from 
Snow White. One of the dwarves chose potato chips, however, and did not receive 
a jewel. At the end of this story, the puppet produced the following target 
sentence. 
(2 1 )  Every dwarf who chose a banana or a strawberry received a jewel. 
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It is important to observe that the target sentence is true only if the disjunction 
operator or is interpreted under the inclusive-or reading. Because the restrictor of 
every is downward entailing, the experimental hypothesis was that children would 
not compute the implicature of exclusivity for (2 1 ), and would therefore, accept 
the test sentences on the inclusive-or reading. However, if children (and adults) 
did compute the implicature and interpret the target sentence under the (derived) 
exclusive-or reading of disjunction, then they should have rejected the puppet' s  
assertion. This did not happen, however. Fifteen children (age from 3 ;7 to  6 ;3  -
mean age: 4; 1 1 ) participated in the experiment. These children correctly accepted 
the target sentence 55  times out of 60 trials (92%). A control group of 1 1  English­
speaking adults correctly accepted the target sentence 42 times out of 44 trials 
(96%). 
3 .2 .  Experiment II: The disjunction or in the second argument of every 
The second experiment reported in the Chierchia et al . study tested children's  
acceptance of  the inclusive-or reading of  disjunction in  the nuclear scope of  the 
universal quantifier every, a non-DE context. On a typical trial, children were told 
a story about four boys at a summer camp who were about to choose some toys to 
play with. After considering their options, the four boys each decided to take both 
a skate-board and a bike. Following the conclusion of the story, the puppet 
produced the following target sentence. 
(22) Every boy chose a skate-board or a bike. 
Since the disjunction operator occurs in a non-downward entailing environment in 
(22), the Semantic Core model predicts that the implicature of exclusivity should 
be calculated. As a consequence, the child subjects should reject the target 
sentence, on the grounds that the corresponding statement with and would have 
yielded a more informative description of the story. This was only partly true. 
Fifteen different children (age from 3 ;5 to 6;2 - mean age: 5 ;2) participated in the 
experiment. They accepted the target sentence 30  times out of 60 (50%).3 Eight 
English-speaking adults served as control group, and the adult controls never 
accepted the target sentences. 
3 . 3 .  The Processing Limitation Hypothesis 
The responses of the adult controls are entirely consistent with the Semantic Core 
model. First, the implicature of exclusivity was cancelled in the restrictor of the 
universal quantifier every (a DE environment), whereas the implicature of 
exclusivity was computed in its nuclear scope (a non-DE environment). As for 
children, however, only some child subjects behaved as expected on the model. 
In order to illustrate how Chierchia et al . (200 1 ) explained the pattern of 
non-adult behavior, it is important to decompose the task that children were asked 
to perform in judging a sentence like (22), repeated below. 
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(22) Every boy chose a skate-board or a bike. 
Since (22) contains a scalar term, the child subjects must (mentally) perform at 
least the following three steps in computing the scalar implicature. First, the child 
must recognize that an alternative sentence is available as a description of the 
context under consideration, namely (23). 
(23) Every boy chose a skate-board and a bike. 
The second step is based on the observation that the puppet used (22), and not 
(23) .  As a consequence, the child should construct a derived interpretation of the 
target sentence. The derived interpretation results from the conjunction of (22) 
and the negation of the alternative statement in (23), yielding (24). 
(24) Every boy chose a skate-board or a bike, and it is not the case that every 
boy chose a skate-board and a bike. 
For the third step, the child must compare the relative information strength of (22) 
and (24) . Since (24) is more informative than (22), the child should adopt (24) as 
the interpretation of the target sentence, and should therefore reject the target 
sentence. It is pertinent to observe that children are not expected to evaluate the 
target sentence (on either interpretation) until all the steps involved in the 
computation of the implicature have been executed. We are now prepared to offer 
an account of children's  non-adult behavior in interpreting disjunction (as 
inclusive-or) in the nuclear scope of every in Experiment II. Recently, Reinhart 
( 1 999) has proposed that limited working memory capacity is the source of 
children's  difficulty with linguistic phenomena that involve the comparison 
between alternative representations of a sentence. We call this the Reference Set 
hypothesis. Here is how Reinhart ( 1 999; p. 1 6) states the hypothesis in discussing 
children' s non-adult interpretation of ordinary pronouns: 
"Assuming that all linguistic knowledge is innate, children know that 
they have to construct a reference set, keep two representations in working 
memory, and check whether the interpretation needed in the given context 
justifies selection of coreference. So they start execution. But their 
working memory is not big enough to hold the materials needed to 
complete the execution of this task. Hence they give up and resort to a 
guess." 
Extending Reinhart's proposal to scalar implicatures, Chierchia et al. (2001 )  
entertain the possibility that children may have mastered the relevant linguistic 
knowledge underlying the computation of scalar implicatures, but that they fail to 
compute these implicatures due to limited computational resources . They call this 
the Processing Limitation hypothesis. 
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The Processing Limitation hypothesis is inspired by the Reference Set 
hypothesis. According to the Processing Limitation hypothesis, children know 
that the interpretation of a sentence containing a scalar term involves the 
computation of an implicature. The local comparison involved in the computation 
of the implicature, however, exceeds children's  limited processing capacities. It is 
important to observe that the Processing Limitation hypothesis put forth by 
Chierchia et al . (2001 )  differs from other proposals about children' s  knowledge of 
pragmatic principles. In particular, the Processing Limitation hypothesis isolates 
one aspect of children's  pragmatic knowledge that can be assessed 
experimentally. The Processing Limitation hypothesis predicts that children 
should behave like adults in any task that does not require the construction of 
alternative representations. For instance, children are expected to behave like 
adults in tasks that assess their knowledge of information strength. In order to 
evaluate this prediction, Chierchia et al . (200 1 )  developed a new experimental 
technique, called the Felicity Judgment task. 
3 .4. Experiment III: The disjunction or and the conjunction and in the second 
argument of every 
The Felicity Judgment task involves the presentation of pairs of assertions. The 
two assertions are presented to children as alternative descriptions of a specific 
situation, much like in a Truth Value Judgment task. Using the Felicity Judgment 
task, Chierchia et al . (2001 )  presented children with one sentence containing the 
disjunction operator or, and one containing the conjunction operator and. 
Importantly, if children did not compute the implicature of exclusivity, both 
alternatives would have been true descriptions of the context. If the source of 
children's  non-adult behavior (when or was in the second argument of every) was 
the processing cost associated with maintaining different representations of the 
target sentence in memory, then presenting children with two explicit 
representations should facilitate their ability to perform the task. By contrast, if 
children completely lacked pragmatic knowledge, including the notion of 
information strength, they should not detect any difference between the two 
sentences. Similarly, if children could not maintain the alternative sentences in 
memory in order to evaluate their relative information strength, then they should 
resort to guessing. 
On one trial, children were told a story about some farmers cleaning their 
animals. After looking at all the animals, each farmer decided to clean both a 
horse and a rabbit. At this point, the two puppets provided their description of the 
story (e.g. , (25) and (26» , and the child was asked to reward the puppet ''who said 
it better." 
(25) Every farmer cleaned a horse or a rabbit. 
(26) Every farmer cleaned a horse and a rabbit. 
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Fifteen children (age from 3 ;2 to 6;0 - mean age: 4;7) participated in the 
experiment.4 They correctly favored the puppet who had used the conjunction 
operator and on 56 out of the 60 trials (93 .3%). The explanation offered by 
Chierchia et al. for this set of findings is that children have knowledge of the 
relative information strength of sentences with or versus ones with and, and they 
also use information strength as the basis of their preference for sentences with 
and. However, children seem unable to perform the recursive procedure necessary 
for computing the scalar implicature associated with or. Overall, the findings 
support the Processing Limitation hypothesis, but they are inconsistent with the 
more general Reference Set hypothesis. In fact children were able to maintain two 
alternative statements in memory, and decide between them. Children do seem 
unable, however, to construct the relevant alternatives on-line, such that they fail 
to compute implicatures if the alternatives are not explicitly presented to them. 
3 .5 .  Experiment IV: The disjunction or and the conjunction and in the first 
argument of every 
Experiment N was designed to determine whether English-speaking children 
know that a statement containing the disjunction operator or is more informative 
than a statement containing the conjunction and in the scope of a downward 
entailing linguistic trigger. Fifteen children (age from 4;6 to 6; 1 - mean: 5;3)  
participated in a Felicity Judgment task. 
On a typical trial, children were told a story about an Easter Bunny who 
was getting ready to hide the Easter eggs. The Easter Bunny had a lot of things 
that he could not take with him, however. In particular, the Easter Bunny has four 
bunches of flowers, four turtles and two teddy bears. Six girls who were good 
friends of the Easter Bunny offered to take care of the Easter Bunny' s belongings. 
The girls started to choose what to care for among the flowers, the turtles and the 
teddy bears. Initially, each girl took one object, except for one girl who took both 
teddy bears. Afterwards three of the girls who had taken only one object decided 
to take a second object. When all the girls had made their choices, the child 
subject could see that three girls had taken both a turtle and a bunch of flowers, 
one girl had only taken a turtle, one girl had only taken a bunch of flowers, and 
the last girl had taken both of the teddy bears. The Easter Bunny was thankful, 
and he wanted to make sure that the girls had everything they would need. In 
particular, he gave some water to the girls who had chosen a turtle and to the girls 
who had chosen a bunch of flowers. Importantly, the Easter Bunny did not give 
any water to the girl who had chosen the teddy bears. We represent the outcome 
of the story in the following diagram. 
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(27) girI t � turtle & bunch of flowers � bottle of water 
girh � turtle & bunch of flowers � bottle of water 
girl) � turtle & bunch of flowers � bottle of water 
girl4 � turtle � bottle of water 
girls � bunch of flowers � bottle of water 
girl6 � 2 teddy bears 
At this point, the two puppets produced the following test sentences: 
(28) Every girl who picked a turtle or a bunch of flowers received a bottle of 
water. 
(29) Every girl who picked a turtle and a bunch of flowers received a bottle of 
water. 
It is important to observe that both sentences are true on their basic interpretation. 
The sentence containing the conjunction and, however, raises an implicature, 
resulting from the interaction of the scalar term and and the quantifier every, 
which is downward entailing on its first argument. More specifically, the 
implicature consists of the negation of the strongest statement, (i .e., the statement 
in (28» . When this is added to the plain interpretation of (29), the result is the 
derived interpretation, which can be paraphrased as in (30), and more 
perspicuously as in (3 1 ). 
(30) Every girl who picked a turtle and a bunch of flowers received a bottle of 
water, and it is not the case that every girl who picked a turtle or a bunch 
of flowers received a bottle of water. 
(3 1 )  Every girl who picked a turtle and a bunch of flowers received a bottle of 
water, and some girl who picked a turtle or a bunch of flowers did not 
receive a bottle of water. 
Importantly, the implicature is not met in the context. This makes (29) 
infelicitous, and this, in turn, should lead children to choose the statement in (28), 
which constitutes the stronger alternative. 
The computation of the implicature for (29) is not the only reason children 
might prefer the sentence in (28). Suppose such an implicature is not calculated. 
Under this hypothesis, children might prefer the use of the disjunction operator or 
because it is more informative than the corresponding sentence with the 
conjunction operator and. s 
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Here are the results. Children expressed a preference in 40 out of 60 trials. 
In keeping with the Semantic Core model, children chose the sentence containing 
the disjunction operator in 36 out of these 40 trials (90% of the time) on which 
they expressed a preference for one statement over the other. The findings show 
that English-speaking children know that the use of the disjunction operator or 
yields a more informative assertion in a downward entailing context. Moreover, 
the findings reveal another context in which children are capable of making 
inferences based on pragmatic information, namely information strength. 
As the reader might observe, the context employed in the present 
experiment differs from the one used in the Truth Value Judgment task conducted 
by Chierchia et al. (200 1 )  assessing the same linguistic context. In short, in the 
context employed by Chierchia et al. (200 1 )  all the relevant characters had chosen 
a pair of objects, whereas in the present experiment two characters chose exactly 
one object. The difference is crucial, however. For ease of exposition, let us 
sketch the context used by Chierchia et al . (2001 )  through the following scheme. 
(32) dwarf! ---+ banana & strawberry jewel 
banana & strawberry jewel 
banana & strawberry jewel 
potato chips 
The findings reported by Chierchia et al. (2001 )  show that in such context 
English-speaking children consistently accept a sentence like (33). This result is 
perfectly expected on the Semantic Core model, since the disjunction operator 
occurs in the first argument of the quantifier every, a downward entailing 
environment. 
(33)  Every dwarf who chose a strawberry or a banana received a jewel. 
Let us now consider what children could do if they were asked to choose between 
(33)  and (34), in the same context. 
(33)  Every dwarfwho chose a strawberry or a banana received a jewel. 
(34) Every dwarf who chose a strawberry and a banana received a jewel. 
Since children were presented with a context in which all of the dwarves who 
received a jewel had chosen both a banana and a strawberry, it is possible that 
they would prefer the assertion in (34) . Such result would not be immediately 
explained under the Semantic Core model. In our view, however, the reason 
children (and adults) could prefer (34) over (33) is independent of the 
computation of the implicature for (34) or the difference in information strength 
between (33) and (34). Suppose that the implicature associated with conjunction 
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had not been computed. Under this scenario, one could either accept both 
sentences on the grounds that they are both true, or one could even prefer the use 
of the weaker statement. In particular, a prudent speaker who did not calculate the 
implicature for (34), might reject the sentence containing disjunction because this 
sentence conveys more information that the speaker has evidence for. More 
precisely, the sentence containing the disjunction operator could lead the hearer to 
expect that if a dwarf had chosen only a banana, he would have also received a 
jewel. The speaker does not have any evidence that this would have happened, 
however. Since one should only say what one has evidence for, the hearer is 
invited to choose (34). It is important to observe that, according to this hypothesis, 
the choice of (34) over (33) would be dictated by the Principle of Cooperation, 
and would not denote lack of pragmatic knowledge. This potential problem of the 
context outlined in (32) explains why a different context was used in Experiment 
N, as compared to Experiment I. 
To sum up, we described three experiments by Chierchia et al. (200 1 )  and 
one experiment original to the present study. Two experiments employed the 
Truth Value Judgment task. These experiments were concerned with children' s  
interpretation of  the disjunction operator in the first and the second argument of 
the universal quantifier every. Two further experiments employed the Felicity 
Judgment task and assessed the relative information strength of sentences 
containing the connectives and and or in the first argument of the universal 
quantifier every, and in its second argument. The findings of the experiments are 
consistent with the Semantic Core model. In the next section we discuss some 
further consequences and loose ends related to our experimental findings. 
4. Discussion 
A few comments about the experimental results of Experiment N are in place. In 
particular, one needs to explain why children did not make any choice in one third 
of the trials. In our view, one should be cautious in interpreting these results as 
showing that children lack pragmatic knowledge.6 Rather, one needs to bear in 
mind the weakness of indirect implicatures (as compared to direct implicatures), 
and the complexity of the task that children were asked to perform. Let us 
consider each issue in turn. 
The implicature that accompanies the use of the conjunction and results 
from the interaction between the scalar term and and the downward entailing 
operator every. As we saw in section 2, implicatures of this type are indirect 
implicatures. In order to motivate the distinction between direct and indirect 
implicatures, Chierchia (2001 )  draws upon the results of an experimental study 
conducted by Gualmini (2001 ). Gualmini (2001 )  presented English-speaking 
adults with sentences like (35) in a context in which each of the pirates looked for, 
but failed to find the jewel and the necklace that had been hidden by an Indian. 
(35) None of the pirates stole the jewel and the necklace. 
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The interaction between the conjunction and and the downward entailing 
environment created by none of the creates an implicature that can be paraphrased 
as follows: 
(36) Some pirate found either the jewel or the necklace. 
In a context in which no pirate found the jewel and no pirate found the necklace, 
the implicature is not met. Therefore, adult speakers of English should reject (3 5) 
on the grounds that the alternative statement in (37) provides a more informative 
description of the context. 
(37) None of the pirates found the jewel or the necklace. 
The adults that Gualmini (2001 )  interviewed, however, consistently accepted (3 5) 
in the situation in which (37) was true. 
In a second experiment, Gualmini (2001 )  used the Felicity Judgment task. 
In this case, adult speakers of English were asked to choose between (35) and 
(37). The main finding was that whenever the subjects favored one sentence over 
the other (Le., in half of the trials), they overwhelmingly chose the sentence with 
the disjunction operator or. Overall, these results are interpreted by Chierchia 
(2001 )  as showing that adult speakers of English do compute indirect 
implicatures, although these are weaker than direct implicatures.  
Let us now consider the complexity of the task. Two types of behavior 
revealed that children experienced difficulty. First, some children repeatedly 
asked the puppets to repeat themselves, thereby showing that children were 
experiencing some difficulty in comparing the target sentences. A second, and 
possibly more interesting, sign of children's  difficulty comes from the responses 
of those children who rejected the use of the disjunction operator. When these 
children were asked to motivate their choice, and say ''what really happened," 
they consistently refrained from using the universal quantifier and resorted to 
sentences like (3 8) : 
(3 8) This girl chose a turtle and a bunch of flowers and she got some water, and 
this girl chose a turtle and she got some water, and this girl got a bunch of 
flowers and she also got some water, and these two girls chose a turtle and 
a bunch of flowers and they got some water. 
In our view, it would be misleading to take such response as denoting lack of 
pragmatic knowledge. Rather, we think that sentences containing the disjunction 
or and the universal quantifier every raise an additional problem, which was 
orthogonal to our current concern. Namely, children experienced difficulty with 
sentences containing the disjunction or when they expressed generalizations over 
individuals.7 Importantly, one could eliminate this possible confounding factor by 
presenting children with a different scalar term (e.g. , the indefinite article a). 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper reviewed the main assumptions of the Semantic Core model of scalar 
implicatures and some experimental research motivated by that model. We also 
presented a new experiment designed to investigate children's  knowledge of the 
relative information strength of sentences containing alternative scalar terms in 
the restrictor of the universal quantifier every, a downward entailing environment. 
The experimental findings provide evidence that young children have mastered 
the prerequisites to the computation of scalar implicatures, including the notion of 
information strength. 
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1 .  See Kadmon and Landman (1 993) on the role of information strength in the 
theory of negative polarity items. 
2. This reasoning is supported by the observation that children and adults are 
known to accept an ambiguous sentence on any (grammatically well-formed) 
interpretation that makes the sentence true in a context. 
3 .  The children who participated in Experiment II of the Chierchia et al . study can 
be divided in two distinct groups: one group of children consistently applied 
scalar implicatures (like adults), and a second group consistently ignored scalar 
implicatures (unlike adults). We refer the reader to the original study for a 
discussion of the individual results. 
4. The children who participated in this experiment were different from the 
children who were tested in Experiments I and II using the Truth Value Judgment 
task. 
S .  Intuitively, there is an additional factor that could lead children to prefer (28) 
over (29) in the context under consideration. The sentence containing the 
disjunction operator extends to more characters (i .e. ,  giri t ,  girh, girh, gir4, and 
girls) than the sentence containing the conjunction operator (i.e., girlh girh, girh). 
Further research is needed to determine if this difference in 'empirical coverage' 
is invoked by children. 
6. It is pertinent to observe that even if one wants to interpret the results as 
supporting the Pragmatic Delay hypothesis, the data suggest that this explanation 
is more limited in scope than previously assumed. Moreover, one would need to 
explain why the pragmatic delay affects the computation of indirect implicatures 
to a greater extent than the computation of direct implicatures. 
7.  A similar phenomenon has been discussed by Boster and Crain ( 1 993).  Boster 
and Crain ( 1 993) discovered some non-adult behavior in children's  interpretation 
of the sentences containing the disjunction or in the scope of the universal 
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ghostbuster will choose a dog or a pig in a context in which every ghostbuster 
had chosen exactly one object. However, almost every child imposed an 
additional restriction on the interpretation of Every ghostbuster will choose a dog 
or a pig. One group of children expected the kind of animal chosen by the 
ghostbuster to be the same for all ghostbusters, and a second group of children 
expected the kind of animal chosen by the ghostbuster not to be the same for all 
ghostbusters. We refer the reader to the original paper for discussion of the 
results. 
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